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The Kenyan Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission:  
The Importance of Commissioners  
and Their Appointment Process1 
 
Kimberly Lanegran 
klanegra@coe.edu 
 
 
In May 2013, Kenya’s Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission 
(TJRC) presented its long-delayed final report to President Uhuru 
Kenyatta.  In four thick volumes, the commission synthesized and 
interpreted information gathered over the past four years regarding 
gross human rights violations and historical injustices in Kenya.  The 
Report presents damning indictments of the governments led by each 
of Kenya’s first three presidents, Jomo Kenyatta, the current 
President’s father, Daniel arap Moi, and Mwai Kibaki, finding 
individuals and organizations in each administration responsible for 
assassinations, mass human rights violations against groups and 
political opponents, as well as wide scale corruption and economic 
crimes.  Furthermore, it documents “state sanctioned systematic 
discrimination” against women and girls.2 It recommends 
prosecution of 32 named individuals; an additional 33 people should 
be banned from holding public office; and government should begin 
investigations into allegations against a further 229 individuals and 12 
                                                 
1 This paper is based on a paper presented at the International Studies Association 
Annual Convention in San Diego, CA in 2012.  The author gratefully acknowledges 
the helpful comments of two anonymous reviewers and the financial support of 
Coe College’s  Edward S. Murray Memorial Research fund. 
2 Kenya Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, “Report of the Truth, 
Justice and Reconciliation Commission,” (3 May 2013) Volume 1, vii; available 
from www.tjrckenya.org. Hereafter: “Report.” 
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businesses.3  Many current officials are implicated.  Notably, 
President Uhuru Kenyatta and his Deputy, William Ruto, currently 
facing prosecution by the International Criminal Court, are among 
those accused of planning and financing the violence that followed 
Kenya’s disputed 2007 national elections.  
 Many people inside and outside the truth commission feared 
that a final report would never be written.  A scandal surrounding the 
commission’s Chairman, Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat, tainted its 
birth, nearly destroyed it before work began, plagued it throughout its 
operations, and may still diminish the commission’s impact and 
tarnish its legacy.  Prominent human rights groups vigorously argued 
that Kiplagat himself was linked to human rights violations that the 
truth commission was expected to investigate.  As a result, the truth 
commission lacked support and legitimacy, and was largely 
incapacitated for the entire first year of its mandate.4  During the 
months when the commission finally engaged in substantive hearings 
and data-collection, Kiplagat stepped aside to facilitate formal 
investigations into his suitability.  Then, just as the writing phase was 
beginning in earnest, Kiplagat claimed he had no obligation to recuse 
himself and surprised the commission staff by returning to his office.   
Eventually, an uneasy accommodation was reached; Ambassador 
Kiplagat returned as Chairman, but he agreed to not participate in 
writing the final report and would not review sections of the report in 
which he had an alleged conflict of interest.5   
 The controversy had been so prominent that the commission 
was compelled to include in its Report a lengthy section on the 
“credibility and suitability of the chairperson.”6  As a result much of 
the Kenyan media coverage of the Report’s release rehashed the 
                                                 
3 Kenya Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, “Report”  Volume IV, 
Appendix One; available from www.tjrckenya.org. 
4 Interview with ICTJ-Kenya spokesperson, Nairobi, Kenya June 23, 2011; 
Interview with Tecla Namachanja Wanjala Nairobi, Kenya June 22, 2011. 
5 Kenya Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, “Report” Volume 1, 
chapter 4, 139; available from www.tjrckenya.org. 
6 Kenya Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, “Report” Volume 1, 
chapter 4, 124-144; available from www.tjrckenya.org. 
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scandal.  Indeed, as many predicted, the Commission found sufficient 
evidence against Ambassador Kiplagat to include him in the list of 
those who should be investigated for prosecution. This drew 
attention away from victims of atrocities in Kenya whose stories were 
conveyed in the Report and gave fuel to those seeking to delegitimize 
the commission’s conclusions and recommendations. 
 This cautionary tale highlights a hitherto under-examined 
feature of truth commission—the importance of commissioners and 
their appointment processes.  Because there is so very little research 
on selection processes for commissions, the advice given to leaders 
establishing new commissions remains simplistic.  For example, in 
2011 after the government of Brazil passed legislation establishing its 
National Truth Commission, the International Center on Transitional 
Justice (ICTJ) advised President Dilma Rousseff “to select members 
of the commission on the basis of careful, transparent consultation 
with civil society, ensuring all commissioners are widely respected 
and regarded as politically independent, capable and impartial.”7  But 
no body of analysis explains how to design a transparent consultative 
process with civil society; there is no comparative evidence yet that 
demonstrates that impartial commissioners are actually best; and 
there is no consensus concerning what skills or experiences make a 
person a capable commissioner. 
 As a foray into this research agenda, this article analyzes the 
process through which Bethuel Kiplagat became the chairperson of 
Kenya’s truth commission to provide lessons to people designing 
future truth commissions.8  I assess the state of the field concerning 
best practices for appointing truth commissioners and evaluate the 
degree to which Kenya’s TJRC complied with them.  Second, I test 
the popular perception that Bethuel Kiplagat was appointed by the 
                                                 
7 International Center for Transitional Justice, “Brazil: Six Critical Steps for Truth 
Commission Success,” (September 22, 2011); available from www.ictj.org. 
8 Fieldwork in Kenya was conducted in June 2011; interviews were conducted with 
eight high-ranking members of the Kenyan TJRC and five leaders of human rights 
organizations that worked with or criticized the truth commission.  Primary 
documents were provided by the truth commission and human rights 
organizations. 
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Kenyan government to undermine the truth-seeking agenda.  I 
conclude that a generally well-designed commissioner selection 
process was followed in Kenya’s case, yet it failed to promote an 
appropriate slate of candidates for the truth commission.  The 
evidence does not demonstrate that Kiplagat’s nomination and 
appointment were part of a concerted government effort to sabotage 
the truth commission.  Rather, the Kibaki government’s role was 
more subtle; it had opportunity to ensure that individuals with strong 
human rights credentials became commissioners but lacked the desire 
to do so.  My main theoretical conclusion is that technical issues such 
as selection processes are not an important as a broader challenge 
quite well known to observers of truth commissions:  political will to 
support an active truth-seeking project.  
  
What we “know” about truth commissioners 
Little scholarship on commissioners—their selection processes, best 
practices, experiences or impact—has been conducted, and 
discussions about commissioners focus on only a few broad 
questions.  Should members of a commission represent specific 
segments of society, or should they be neutral parties?  What exactly 
is the best role for commissioners?  Should they be active in the 
commission’s daily work or serve more like a board of directors?  
Should a truth commission be led by citizens of the country or 
foreign nationals or a combination of both?  Consensus is, however, 
coalescing around the position that a transparent consultative 
selection process is best.  Yet, arguments rest on anecdotal evidence 
and theoretical assertions rather than systematic comparisons. 
 The lack of careful study of truth commissioners is 
lamentable given the emerging evidence of their impact on a 
commission’s success or failure.  In a rare comparative study based 
on interviews with former staff of truth commissions, Joanna Quinn 
and Mark Freeman conclude, “Perhaps the most important task for 
framers [of truth commissions] is the appointment of the 
commissioners.  How many people will act as commissioners?  Who 
4
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will they be, and what will be the process for their selection?”9  In its 
major advisory document for post-conflict states considering 
establishing truth commissions, the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights notes, “Ultimately, no factor 
will more define the [truth] commission than the persons who serve 
as its members.”10 Priscilla Hayner, in her extensive overview of truth 
commissions notes, “As the public face of the commission, the 
members’ personal and political authority is critical in dealing with 
recalcitrant authorities and in persuading the public to trust and 
engage with the process.”11 Poor leadership by commissioners and 
staff has indeed been blamed for poor investigations of crimes and 
loss of donor support in a number of cases, including Haiti and Sierra 
Leone.12   
 Overall, precious little is known about the “best practices” 
for selecting appropriate commissioners or what makes a “good” 
commissioner.  Observers agree that it is vitally important to do this 
right, but give only the most general words of advice.  For example, 
the ICTJ advises selecting commissioners who are neutral, enjoy the 
public’s confidence in their human rights record, represent diverse 
perspectives, have relevant professional experience and are able to 
work full-time.13  But the broader literature offers conflicting advice.   
Either pick impartial individuals (if impartiality is believed possible) 
                                                 
9 Joanna R. Quinn and Mark Freeman, “Lessons Learned:  Practical Lessons 
Gleaned from Inside the Truth Commissions of Guatemala and South Africa,” 
Human Rights Quarterly 25 (2003): 1128. 
10 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Rule-of-
Law Tools for Post-Conflict States:  Truth Commissions” (2006), 13; available 
from www.ohchr.org. 
11 Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths:  Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth 
Commissions 2nd edition (New York: Routledge, 2011), 212. 
12 Joanna Quinn, “Haiti’s Failed Truth Commission:  Lessons in Transitional 
Justice, Journal of Human Rights 8  (2009): 265-281; Beth Dougherty, “Searching for 
Answers:  Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” African Studies 
Quarterly 8:1 (2004): 39-56;  Augustine S. J. Park, “Community-based Restorative 
Transitional Justice in Sierra Leone,”  Contemporary Justice Review 13:1 (2010):  95-
119. 
13 International Center for Transitional Justice, “Truth Seeking: Elements of 
Creating an Effective Truth Commission” (2013), 18; available from www.ictj.org. 
5
Lanegran: Challenges of a Leadership Scandal
Published by Scholarship@Western, 2015
  
 
 
 
 
Kimberly Lanegran  46 
 
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.3, 2015, 41-71 
 
or pick a representative group of partial individuals who can 
neutralize each other’s biases.14  A relatively weak panel of 
commissioners can work,15 but an active one would be needed to 
hold public hearings.16  A few foreigners on a commission might be 
beneficial,17 but there is no comprehensive scholarship examining 
whether they make a difference to a commission. 
 There is significant agreement in the literature, however, that 
it is best to use a consultative process when selecting the people to 
serve on a truth commission.  Rather than just having a President 
unilaterally appoint commissions, as Brazil’s President Rousseff was 
empowered to do, a number of writers suggest that the public should 
be broadly engaged in the selection process.18 The UNHCHR 
                                                 
14 Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies:  The Impact on 
Human Rights and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2010), 157;  M. C. W. Pinto, 
“Truth and Consequences or Truth and Reconciliation?  Some Thoughts on the 
Potential of Official Truth Commissions,” in Man’s Inhumanity to Man:  Essays on 
International Law in Honour of Antonio Cassese  edited by Lal Chand Vohrah, Fausto 
Pocar, Yvonne Featherstone, Olivier Fourmy, Christine Graham, John Hocking 
and Nicholas Robson (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003), 693-728; 
Audrey R. Chapman and Patrick Ball, “The Truth of Truth Commissions:  
Comparative Lessons from Haiti, South Africa, and Guatemala,”  Human Rights 
Quarterly 23 (2001): 17; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, “Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States:  Truth Commissions” 
(2006), 13; available from www.ohchr.org. 
15 Audrey R. Chapman and Patrick Ball, “The Truth of Truth Commissions:  
Comparative Lessons from Haiti, South Africa, and Guatemala,” Human Rights 
Quarterly 23 (2001): 42. 
16 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Rule-of-
Law Tools for Post-Conflict States:  Truth Commissions” (2006), 14; available 
from www. ohchr.org.  
17 M. C. W. Pinto, “Truth and Consequences or Truth and Reconciliation?  Some 
Thoughts on the Potential of Official Truth Commissions,” in Man’s Inhumanity to 
Man:  Essays on International Law in Honour of Antonio Cassese  edited by Lal Chand 
Vohrah, Fausto Pocar, Yvonne Featherstone, Olivier Fourmy, Christine Graham, 
John Hocking and Nicholas Robson (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003), 
720; Joanna R. Quinn and Mark Freeman, “Lessons Learned:  Practical Lessons 
Gleaned from Inside the Truth Commissions of Guatemala and South Africa,” 
Human Rights Quarterly  25 (2003): 1128. 
18 Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths:  Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth 
Commissions 2nd edition (New York: Routledge, 2011), 212. 
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advises, “Truth commissions will garner the greatest public and 
international support if their members are selected through a 
consultative process... [which] may include inviting nominations from 
the public and forming a representative selection panel (appointed by 
a variety of sectors or societal groupings) to vet the nominations and 
interview the finalists, recommending the final commissioners to the 
appointing authority.”19  However, in practice, while the unilateral 
presidential appointment process has resulted in some inappropriate 
panels of commissioners, some Presidents appointed an admirable 
group of commissioners.  Furthermore, some inclusive processes 
have led to poor choices. 
 The Heads of State of Serbia, Uganda, Ghana, and Nigeria 
were empowered to appoint their countries’ truth commissioners 
with little input from civil society or other government bodies.  At 
one extreme, Yugoslavia’s Vojislav Koštunica and Uganda’s Yoweri 
Museveni took the opportunity to appoint allies so as to enable 
government manipulation and suppression of the truth-seeking 
processes.  Largely as a result, neither commission gained widespread 
legitimacy or fulfilled its mandate.20  At the other extreme, even 
though Ghana’s John Kufour only consulted with the advisory 
Council of State and the selection process of Nigeria’s Olusegun 
Obasanjo remained a mystery to even the commissioners themselves, 
the individuals they appointed were all regarded as neutral and some 
were highly respected in their countries.21  Although these 
                                                 
19 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Rule-of-
Law Tools for Post-Conflict States:  Truth Commissions” (2006), 13-14; available 
from www.ohchr.org. 
20 Jelena Subotić, Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in the Balkans (Ithaca:  Cornell 
University Press, 2009), 55;  Joanna R. Quinn, “Constraints:  The Un-Doing of the 
Ugandan Truth Commission,” Human Rights Quarterly 26 (2004): 423. 
21 Ken Agyemang Attafuah, “An Overview of Ghana’s National Reconciliation 
Commission and its Relationship with the Courts,” Truth Commissions and Courts:  
The Tension Between Criminal Justice and the Search for Truth edited by William A. 
Schabas and Shane Darcy (The Hague:  Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004), 125-
134; Mathew Kukah, “Peace Versus Justice?  A View from Nigeria,” Peace versus 
Justice?  The Dilemma of Transitional Justice in Africa edited by Chandra Sriram and 
Suren Pillay (Durban: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2009), 171-186; Nneoma 
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commissions had considerable shortcomings, the quality of the 
commissioners themselves was not problematic.  So a unilateral 
appointment process alone does not make the selection of 
appropriate commissioners impossible. 
 Similarly, allowing representatives from a cross-section of 
society to participate does not always inoculate a selection process 
against appointing a problematic panel of commissioners.  As 
mandated by their respective Acts, selection panels were formed to 
appoint the commissioners in East Timor, Sierra Leone and Liberia.  
Specific political parties and NGOs and religious organizations had 
to be represented on the selection panels in East Timor and Sierra 
Leone; in Liberia, the representative from the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS) had to coordinate the selection of 
“[t]hree representatives from civil society organizations, [and t]wo 
representatives from political parties” to join the ECOWAS and UN 
representatives on a panel to nominate commissioners.22  In each 
case, the panels were directed to solicit nominations from the public, 
vet candidates and recommend a short list to the head of government 
for appointment.  In East Timor, this process worked well 
appointing seven respected, yet not necessarily prominent, individuals 
with experience in human rights or religious institutions from across 
the political spectrum.23  In Sierra Leone and Liberia, however, most 
of the appointees lacked appropriate experience and skills.  Notably, 
both of these commissions lacked strong leadership, which hampered 
each body’s ability to deal effectively with difficulties working with 
staff, as in Sierra Leone’s case,24 or tension within the commission, as 
in Liberia.  Lansana Gberie noted that in Liberia, “The Chair, Jerome 
                                                                                                             
V. Nwogu, Shaping Truth, Reshaping Justice:  Sectarian Politics and the Nigerian Truth 
Commission (New York:  Lexington Books, 2007). 
22 National Transitional Legislative Assembly of Liberia, “Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Liberia Mandate,” (Monrovia Liberia, May 12 2005), section 8; 
available from www.trcofliberia.org/about/trc-mandate. 
23 Jen Laakso, “In Pursuit and Truth, Justice and Reconciliation:  The Truth 
Commissions of East Timor and South Africa,” Social Alternatives 22:2 (2003): 52. 
24 International Crisis Group “Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission:  A Fresh Start” (20 December 2002), 6; available from  www.icg.org. 
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Verdier, [was] a young activist lawyer with little political and—even 
less—moral clout, both necessary for leadership of an institution of 
huge potential national and international importance.”25 Clearly an 
inclusive selection process alone is insufficient for ensuring that 
skilled and effective commissioners are appointed. 
  
First attempt at a truth commission for Kenya 
The first serious discussions about Kenya implementing a truth 
commission came at the end of President Daniel arap Moi’s tenure in 
2002.  After Kenya’s independence, the Kenya African National 
Union (KANU) dominated under first Jomo Kenyatta and later 
Daniel arap Moi.  This era saw the creation of an authoritarian 
government led by an imperial presidency notable for political 
repression, corruption and human rights abuses.  With President 
Moi’s retirement and KANU’s defeat, the 2002 elections created an 
opportunity for the new government to address past human rights 
violations and establish new pro-human rights policies. 
 Hoping to signal that his administration marked the end to 
past atrocities, President Mwai Kibaki and his National Rainbow 
Coalition (NARC) government considered investigating past human 
rights crimes.  In April 2003, the Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Affairs empowered The Task Force on the 
Establishment of a Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission “to 
find out if a truth commission was necessary for Kenya, and, if so, to 
make recommendations on the type of truth commission that ought 
to be established.”26  It was chaired by Professor Makau Mutua, the 
energetic chairman of the Kenya Human Rights Commission.   
 After extensive consultations with the public, civil society and 
transitional justice experts, Mutua and his committee concluded that 
Kenyans did indeed need and want a truth commission to investigate 
the crimes of the Kenyatta-Moi era.  It found evidence of unsolved 
                                                 
25 Lansana Gberie, “Truth and Justice on Trial in Liberia,” African Affairs 107:428 
(2008):456. 
26 Government of Kenya, “Report of the Task Force on the Establishment of a 
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission,” (August 26, 2003), 11; available 
from  www.marsgroupkenya.org. 
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human rights violations and economic crimes that needed 
investigation27 and concluded that Kenyans believed a truth 
commission would benefit their country.28  In August 2003, it 
submitted a comprehensive report making the case for a truth 
commission and offering detailed recommendations for its structure, 
mandate, and powers.  The Kenyan human rights community 
regarded this as exemplar work and endorsed the call for a truth 
commission. 
However, political machinations led the government to 
abandon the truth-seeking project.  It is clear that even at the Task 
Force’s launch few Kenyan politicians embraced the endeavor whole-
heartedly.  All prominent members of NARC had at one point been 
KANU members; some had just abandoned Moi earlier than others.  
Task Force chairman Mutua knew at the time that a truth 
commission had few advocates in NARC.29  It would be preferable to 
simply claim that their government would change the status quo 
without running the risk of being exposed as complicit in past 
violations. 
Furthermore, the ruling coalition was extremely fragile as 
Mwai Kibaki’s and Raila Odinga’s camps soon were embroiled in 
serious disagreements about power-sharing and constitutional 
reforms.  Godfrey Musila blames this fallout for destroying the 
momentum behind the truth commission.30 As Kibaki and Odinga 
struggled for advantage over each other, each sought alliances with 
additional KANU politicians.  A spokesperson of the Kenya Human 
Rights Commission explains that the agenda for the truth 
                                                 
27 Government of Kenya, “Report of the Task Force on the Establishment of a 
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission,” (August 26, 2003), 21; available 
from  www.marsgroupkenya.org. 
28 Government of Kenya, “Report of the Task Force on the Establishment of a 
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission,” (August 26, 2003), 9; available 
from  www.marsgroupkenya.org. 
29 Makau Mutua, Kenya’s Quest for Democracy:  Taming Leviathan (Boulder:  Lynne 
Rienner, 2008), 209. 
30 Godfrey Musila, “Options for Transitional Justice in Kenya:  Autonomy and the 
Challenge of External Prescriptions,” The International Journal of Transitional Justice 3 
(2009): 449. 
10
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commission was lost in 2004 when the government embraced and 
brought on board some of the KANU leaders expected to be 
investigated by the truth commission.31   Politicians dropped their 
lukewarm interest in a truth commission so as to not cause 
embarrassment for new allies. 
 
Establishing Kenya’s TJRC 
The proposal for a truth commission lay neglected until after the 
violence that followed Kenya’s elections of December 2007.  
International negotiators, led by Kofi Annan, guided Kenyan 
politicians and civil society in a National Dialogue and Reconciliation 
Process to end the post-election violence and foster political reform, 
reconciliation and justice for the country.  During those negotiations, 
the idea of a truth commission was resuscitated, and the parties 
eventually agreed to establish the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission. 
 The National Rainbow Coalition had collapsed over the 2005 
Constitutional referendum ending the partnership between Kibaki 
and Odinga.  Consequently, in the 2007 election Raila Odinga leading 
the new Orange Democratic Movement ran for the Presidency 
against Mwai Kibaki, leading his newly formed Party of National 
Unity (PNU).32  Early results released a few days after the election 
had ODM parliamentary candidates and Odinga ahead in Western 
and Rift valley and the PNU gaining with results from Central Kenya 
and Eastern.  Yet, final results were delayed.  On December 29, the 
head of the election commission speculated that this delay was 
caused by results “being cooked.”33 Then on December 30, he 
announced suddenly that Kibaki had won, and within an hour, 
                                                 
31 Kenya Human Rights Commission Spokesperson Interview, Nairobi, Kenya June 
23, 2011. 
32 Peter Kagwanja and Roger Southall, “Introduction:  Kenya- A Democracy in 
Retreat?”  Journal of Contemporary African Studies 27: 3 (2009): 259-277. 
33 Michael Chege, “Kenya:  Back from the Brink,” Journal of Democracy 19: 4 (2008): 
137. 
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Kibaki was sworn in to a second term. The ODM, however, had 
defeated PNU in the Parliamentary elections.34  
 Almost immediately, riots began in areas loyal to Odinga who 
felt the presidency had been stolen from him.  Soon, violence spread 
until Kenya was in its worst crisis since the coup attempt in 1982.  By 
the time the mayhem ceased, more than 1000 people were killed and 
more than 300,000 had fled their homes.35  Kenyans and the 
international community were shocked and horrified. 
 Amid domestic and international calls for peace, the main 
political parties entered into negotiations mediated by Kofi Annan 
and others from the African Union’s Panel of Eminent Africans.  On 
February 1, the parties announced that they agreed to tackle four 
major task at hand:  achieving the immediate end to violence, 
implementing “measures to address the humanitarian crisis 
[principally facing displaced people], promote reconciliation, healing 
and restoration,” overcoming the current political crisis concerning 
the election results, and devising long-term solutions to the problems 
that had ultimately given rise to the crisis.36  A February 14 agreement 
put a truth commission squarely back on Kenya’s reform agenda.37   
 The truth commission proposal appears to have been 
brought back to life by members of Annan’s negotiating team.  One 
high ranking member of the commission believes that Kenyan 
politicians certainly would not have called for a truth-seeking project 
at that time; there continued to be no political will for it.38 The 
impetuous probably came from elsewhere.  Priscilla Hayner, 
                                                 
34 Dorina Bekoe, “Kenya:  Setting the Stage for Durable Peace?” US Institute for 
Peace Briefing (April 2008), 1; available from www.usip.org. 
35 International Crisis Group, “Africa Report No. 137 Kenya in Crisis” (21 
February 2008), 1; available from www. icg.org. 
36 Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation, “On the Resolution of the Political 
Crisis Annotated Agenda and Timetable,” (Nairobi, Kenya 1 February 2008); 
available from www. dialoguekenya.org.  
37 Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation, “Agenda Item Three:  How to 
Solve the Political Crisis,” (Nairobi, Kenya 14 February 2008); available from 
www.dialoguekenya.org. 
38 Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Staff member B, Interview, 
Nairobi, Kenya  June 21 2011.  
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cofounder of the International Center for Transitional Justice, was a 
human rights advisor for Annan’s negotiating team.   Two sources, 
one inside Kenya’s truth commission and another in a human rights 
organization, said that Hayner’s advocacy for a Kenyan truth 
commission was significant in the process.  
 The parties agreed to form a truth commission and specified 
its general features.  The commission should work for two years and 
issue a public report to the government regarding alleged violations 
of political and economic human rights that had occurred in Kenya 
from independence (December 12, 1963) through to the official end 
of the post-election violence (February 28, 2008).  Commissioners 
from outside Kenya, selected by the African Union’s Panel of 
Eminent African Personalities, would sit with a majority of domestic 
commissioners who would be “chosen through a consultative 
process.”  The body was to be independent and fair and could issue 
no blanket amnesty to perpetrators.39  
 Kenya’s truth commission had a number of classic features 
specified in its Act.40 In order “to promote peace, justice, national 
unity, healing and reconciliation,”  it was mandated to establish an 
accurate record of past crimes against humanity and gross human 
rights violations committed by public officers as well as identify the 
causes of those crimes.  It could recommend prosecution of some 
perpetrators and amnesty for others under limited conditions.  It 
could also recommend means of restitution, including reparations, 
for victims.  The commission should hold public hearings and 
needed to publish a final report.  Yet the TJRC also ventured beyond 
the work of previous truth commissions.  Responsible to investigate 
crimes committed over a 45 year period, it had the longest temporal 
jurisdiction of any commission established to date.  More important 
however, Kenya’s was the first truth commission mandated to 
                                                 
39 Human Rights Watch, “Ballots to Bullets:  Organized Political Violence and 
Kenya’s Crisis of Governance,” (March 2008), Annex 1 “Kenya National Dialogue 
and Reconciliation, Agreement establishing a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission.” Available at: www.hrw.org. 
40 Government of Kenya, “The Truth Justice and Reconciliation Act, 2008.” 
Available at: www.tjrckenya.org. 
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investigate economic crimes.  The Act identifies “grand corruption 
and the exploitation of natural or public resources” efforts to illegally 
acquire public lands and “economic marginalization of communities” 
as examples of economic crimes but does not fully define the term.41  
 
Selecting the TJRC Commissioners 
The TJRC Act (Part II section 10) stipulated a process for appointing 
commissioners that complied with much of the advice in the 
literature.  Three of the nine commissioners would be non-citizens 
selected by the Panel of Eminent African Personalities.  Four of the 
commissioners should have “at least fifteen years’ experience in 
matters relating to human rights law;” five “shall have knowledge of 
and experience in forensic audit, investigations, psycho-sociology, 
anthropology and social relations, conflict management, religion or 
gender issues.”  All had to be “impartial in the performance of the 
functions of the Commission... [and] generally enjoy the confidence 
of the people of Kenya.” As a whole, “the Commission shall, as 
much as practicable, be balanced, representative of Kenyan society, 
perceived to be impartial in its collectivity and of diverse professional 
and religious backgrounds.” Furthermore, each commissioner should 
be “of good character and integrity” and have “not in any way been 
involved, implicated, linked or associated with human rights 
violations of any kind or in any matter which is to be investigated 
under this Act.”42 This final requirement proved the most difficult to 
meet. 
 The Panel of Eminent African Personalities was free to 
devise its own selection process while the procedures for appointing 
the six Kenyans were laid out in detail.  A nine person Selection 
Panel was to be formed out of representatives of specific religious, 
legal and professional organizations.43  The Act stipulated that the 
                                                 
41 Government of Kenya, “The Truth Justice and Reconciliation Act, 2008.” Part 
II,6,n-p; available from www.tjrckenya.org. 
42 Government of Kenya, “The Truth Justice and Reconciliation Act, 2008.” Part 
II,10.   Available at: www.tjrckenya.org. 
43  The Act explicitly identified the organizations to be represented on the 
committee to select the commissioners (Government of Kenya, “The Truth Justice 
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selection panel work within a very tight timeframe.  Within two 
weeks of the commencement of the Act, the panel had to be formed 
and publically advertise for nominations for commissioners to be 
submitted during a three week period.  The Selection Panel had only 
seven days to consider the nominees and submit to the National 
Assembly a ranked list of fifteen qualified individuals; the National 
Assembly would pass along six for the President to appoint.  
President Kibaki could appoint the chairperson from among the six.  
Overall, the Act required the National Assembly and the President to 
“have regard to gender equity and regional balance” when 
nominating and appointing commissioners.44 Thus, an inclusive 
consultative selecting process was devised.  
 Indeed that process was closely followed.  The Kenya 
National Commission on Human Rights held workshops for the 
organizations required to participate in the selection panel to 
familiarize them with the TJRC legislation and truth commissions in 
general.45 Once the Act came into force in March 2009, a selection 
                                                                                                             
and Reconciliation Act, 2008.” Part II,9).  Two panelists had to be nominated by a 
joint forum comprising the Kenya Episcopal Conference, National Council of 
Churches of Kenya, Evangelical Alliance of Kenya, the Hindu Council of Kenya, 
the Seventh Day Adventist Church and the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims.  
One person had to be nominated by the Law Society of Kenya.  Another had to be 
nominated by Federation of Kenya Women Lawyers. The Central Organization of 
Trade Unions and the Kenya National Union of Teachers had to jointly nominate 
another panelist.  Another had to come from the Association of Professional 
Societies of East Africa.  Another would be nominated by the Kenya National 
Commission on Human Rights.  The Kenya Private Sector Alliance and Federation 
of Kenya Employers would jointly nominate one panelist.  The final one would be 
nominated by the Kenya Medical Association.  The Chairperson of the selection 
committee was from the Association of Professional Societies in East Africa.  His 
deputy was from the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights.  The 
Secretary was from the Law Society of Kenya (Kenyan Broadcasting Corporation, 
“Minister names members of Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission” 
March 16, 2009). 
44 Government of Kenya, “The Truth Justice and Reconciliation Act, 2008 First 
Schedule: Procedure for Appointing Commissioners” 7.   Available at:  
www.tjrckenya.org. 
45 ICTJ-Kenya spokesperson, Interview, Nairobi, Kenya  June 23, 2011. 
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committee was quickly formed with the proscribed membership.  
The week after nominations closed was very hectic.  Of the nearly 
250 people nominated, the Selection Panel interviewed 47.46 It ranked 
fifteen candidates to send to the National Assembly. The 
Departmental Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs trimmed the 
list to nine: (in rank order) Bethuel Kiplagat, Thomas Letangule, 
Margaret Shava, Tom Ojienda, Timothy Njoya, Betty Murungi, 
Abubakar Zein, Techla Namachanja Wanjala and Ahmed Sheikh.47 
The House approved this list and passed it on to the President to 
select the final six.  In late July 2009 the commissioners were 
announced.  President Kibaki appointed Bethuel Kiplagat chairman 
of the TJRC; his deputy was Betty Murungi.  The other Kenyan 
commissioners were Techla Namachanja Wanjala, Tom Ojienda, 
Margaret Shava, and Ahmed Sheikh.  The Eminent Persons had 
selected Judge Gertrude Chawatama (Zambia), Ambassador Berhanu 
Dinka (Ethiopia) and Professor Ron Slye (USA).   
 Immediately, people expressed dissatisfaction about the panel 
of commissioners.  The international figures were unknown to 
Kenyans.  Some groups were unimpressed by a number of the 
Kenyan nominees and some felt it was inappropriate for Ahmed 
Sheikh, as a retired military officer, to serve.  However, none of those 
complaints compared to the uproar against the appointment of 
Bethuel Kiplagat as chairman.  A selection process that appeared 
designed to engender the greatest possible legitimacy to the panel of 
commissioners had instead created a debacle. 
 
Scandal surrounding Chairman Kiplagat 
Within a week of the announcement of Kiplagat’s appointment, there 
were complaints in the press that he did not meet the selection 
criterion of not having been “involved, implicated, linked or 
                                                 
46 Chairperson of the selection panel quoted in Sarah Wambui, “Experts say Kenya 
Truth Process on Track,” CaptialFM (Feb 11, 2010); available from  
www.capitalfm.co.ke. 
47 Kenyan National Assembly, “Adoption of Report on Nomination of 
Commissioners to the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission” (25 June 
2009). 
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associated with human rights violations of any kind or in any matter 
which is to be investigated” by the TJRC.48  Four arguments were 
made against his appointment.  First, some felt that simply as a 
former high-ranking member of President Moi’s government, he 
could not lead a truth-seeking effort into violations committed by 
that government.49 The Muslim Human Rights Forum, for example, 
called for his removal even before his swearing in because he was “an 
insider in the administration of former President Moi at critical 
moments of gross human rights violations which will be subjects of 
inquiry by the TJRC.”50   
 Furthermore, Kiplagat was already personally associated with 
two prominent crimes which the truth commission would have to 
investigate if it hoped to be seen as credible.  One was the infamous 
“Wagalla Massacre” of 1984 during which government forces 
rounded up thousands of ethnic Somalis, detained them without food 
or water at an airstrip for days and slaughtered hundreds. It was 
arguably the single worst human rights atrocity of independent 
Kenya.  Yet very little is publicly known about who ordered the 
action, and victims and survivors await justice.  There is evidence that 
Bethuel Kiplagat was present at a meeting of the local District 
Security Committee a few days before the security operation in 
Wagalla began.51 Therefore, some allege that he has information 
about the planning of the massacre.  At the very least, many expected 
that the commission would have to interview Kiplagat. 
                                                 
48 Government of Kenya, “The Truth Justice and Reconciliation Act, 2008.” 
Section 10.   Available at: www.tjrckenya.org. 
49 Bethuel Kiplagat joined the Kenyan government in 1978 and held various foreign 
affairs posts including Kenya’s Ambassador to France, High Commissioner to 
Great Britain, and Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  He left 
government in 1991 and served on a number of boards including that of the 
Nairobi Stock Exchange.  He became active in regional peace negotiations serving 
as Kenya’s Special Envoy to Somalia 2003-2005.  He served on the board of the 
International Crisis Group for two years starting in 2004. 
50 Catholic Information Service for Africa, “Religion; Muslim Human Rights 
Forum Rejects Kiplagat” (July 28, 2009); available from www. lexisnexis.com. 
51 S. Abdi Sheikh, Blood on the Runway:  The Wagalla Massacre of 1984 (Nairobi, Kenya:  
Northern Publishing House, 2007), 20. 
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 The other case concerned the murder of the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Robert Ouko, in 1990 when Kiplagat was the 
Permanent Secretary in Ouko’s Ministry.  This assassination is 
arguably Kenya’s greatest unsolved murder despite being the subject 
of one trial and three separate government inquiries.  Some evidence 
suggests that individuals in Moi’s inner circle were responsible for the 
murder.52  Indeed, Kiplagat had served as a witness for each of the 
governmental inquiries into Ouko’s death.  Most problematic for 
Kiplagat’s appointment to the truth commission, the 2005 report of 
the Parliamentary Select Committee’s investigation in Ouko’s death 
noted that an earlier investigation had concluded that Kiplagat was 
untruthful in his statements.   Therefore, the parliamentary 
committee in 2005 had recommended further investigation into what 
Kiplagat knew about Ouko’s assassination.53  Here was another case 
in which he would be a necessary witness in a case Kenyans expected 
the TJRC to investigate.  Critics argued that the chairman testifying 
before his own commission would render the TJRC an illegitimate 
farce. 
 The final argument against Kiplagat’s suitability as a 
commissioner points out that he had already been identified as 
personally responsible for violating the economic rights of Kenyan 
citizens.  The 2004 report by the government’s Commission of 
Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (the 
Ndung’u Report) concluded that Ambassador Kiplagat had illegally 
or irregularly acquired three specific parcels of land.54  Specifically 
                                                 
52 Smith Hempstone,  Rogue Ambassador:  An African Memoir  (Sewanee, TN: 
University of the South Press, 1997), chapter 5. 
53Kenya Human Rights Commission, “The Position of the KHRC on the 
Credibility of Bethuel Kiplagat, the Chair of Kenya’s Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission” (17 February 2010).  On file with author. 
54 Kenya Human Rights Commission, “The Position of the KHRC on the 
Credibility of Bethuel Kiplagat, the Chair of Kenya’s Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission” (17 February 2010).  On file with author; 
International Center for Transitional Justice, “Kenya:  Truth Commission Chair 
Should Step Down” (22 February 2010); available from www.ictj.org; Truth, Justice 
and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya, “A Petition from the Commissioners of 
the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya Pursuant to Section 17 
18
Transitional Justice Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 3
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/tjreview/vol1/iss3/3
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5206/tjr.2015.1.3.3
  
 
 
 
 
59   The Importance of Commissioners and Their Appointment Process 
 
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.3, 2015, 41-71 
 
mandated to investigate economic crimes and make 
recommendations concerning the implementation of previous reports 
like the Ndung’u Report, the TJRC would have been expected to 
directly investigate the actions of its own chairperson.  
  
Impact of the scandal 
One insight the Kenyan case offers to theoretical conceptions of 
truth commissions is the central importance of earning legitimacy in 
the eyes of civil society organizations and maintaining their support.  
Many Kenyan human rights organizations became distrustful of the 
TJRC and demanded that Kiplagat step down.  Some groups 
concluded that the entire TJRC was irretrievably tainted and refused 
to work with it and/or called for it to disband.  Consequently, public 
opinion turned against the commission, the TJRC could not count on 
the assistance of civil society organizations to facilitate its fundraising 
efforts, investigations, and public awareness campaigns, and the 
Kenyan government and foreign donors declined to adequately fund 
the commission.  Eventually, the commission itself turned to 
desperate steps and asked the government to investigate whether 
Kiplagat should be removed from office.  Ultimately, the entire first 
year of the truth commission’s two-year mandate was effectively 
wasted due to the accusations against Kiplagat. 
 To many human rights groups, Kiplagat’s appointment as 
chairman looked like the government’s attempt to sabotage the truth-
seeking agenda and shield those in power from close scrutiny.55 In 
February 2010, calls for Kiplagat’s resignation reached a fever pitch.  
The Kenya Human Rights Commission concluded that Kiplagat 
“falls short of the qualifications of the chair” as stipulated by the Act 
                                                                                                             
and Section 10 of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Act No.6 of 2008, as 
Amended” (April 2010); available from www.tjrckenya.org. 
55Interview with International Centre for Policy and Conflict spokesperson, 
Nairobi, Kenya  June  22, 2011;  Interview with ICTJ-Kenya spokesperson, 
Nairobi, Kenya June 23, 2011. 
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and demanded his resignation.56  Eight Kenyan human rights groups 
issued a similar joint press statement.57  Ten former members of 
other truth commissions, including South Africa’s Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu and four other past chairmen, also called on Kiplagat 
to leave the TJRC citing the allegations of his inability to be impartial 
in important areas of the commission’s work.58 
 Going further, some organizations and individuals argued 
that the truth commission was too discredited and flawed to be 
allowed to go forward.  Kenyans Against Impunity, in September 
2009 called for the commission’s disbanding citing Chairman 
Kiplagat as one of the reasons.59  Makau Mutua repeatedly called for 
the TRJC to fold.  Even in June 2011, when the TJRC had started 
hearings and Kiplagat had stepped down, a few prominent human 
rights activists privately said that they personally felt the TJRC’s 
continued lack of credibility meant it would best for it to be 
disbanded and reconstituted.60  
 However, Kenya’s civil society is not homogenous, and 
organizations had fluid and varying relationships with the TJRC.  
Individual groups made their own calculations about whether and 
how to work with the truth commissions, and those decisions also 
shifted over time.61  FIDA-Kenya, The Catholic Peace and Justice 
Committee and the Kenya National Human Rights Commission are 
among the groups that offered legal assistance and civic education, 
                                                 
56 Kenya Human Rights Commission, “The Position of the KHRC on the 
Credibility of Bethuel Kiplagat, the Chair of Kenya’s Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission” (17 February 2010).  On file with author. 
57 International Centre for Policy and Conflict, “Press statement:  Impunity-Free 
TJRC Bogged by Chair’s Credibility Crisis,” (7 February 2010).  On file with 
author. 
58 Capital FM radio (Kenya), “Archbishop Tutu, Others Urge Head of Kenyan 
Truth Panel to Quit,” February 25 2010; available from www.lexisnexis.com. 
59 Kenyans Against Impunity, “Why We Reject the TJRC as Formed and 
Composed,” September 3, 2009.  On file with author. 
60 Interviews with representative of Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 
Nairobi, Kenya June 23, 2011 and representative of International Center for Policy 
and Conflict Nairobi, Kenya June 22, 2011. 
61 Interview with ICTJ-Kenya spokesperson, Nairobi, Kenya  June 23, 2011. 
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and identified and prepared witnesses to testify at hearings.62  The 
International Committee of Jurists and the International Centre on 
Peace and Conflict, systematically observed the hearings, but did not 
actively assist the commission. 
 As accusations against Chairman Kiplagat increased, he grew 
less popular with Kenyans.  A March 2010 survey showed that the 
public was divided about whether Kiplagat should stay on as 
chairman.  A full 30% of those surveyed didn’t know who the chair 
of the TJRC was.  Of those who could identify him, 49% wanted 
Kiplagat to remain chair while 41% wanted him to resign.63  
 The scandal surrounding the chairman also exacerbated the 
severe funding problems hampering the TJRC.  Originally, the 
commission proposed a total budget of $27 million (approx. 2.4 
billion Kenya shillings) for its two years of work.64 Yet for fiscal year 
2010-11 the Kenyan government agreed to give the commission 16% 
of the funds requested to be distributed in three installments.65  The 
resulting cash flow problems required supplemental government 
funding and increased the necessity of additional financial support 
from donors.  International donors, however, largely refused to fund 
the commission.  In its 2011 progress report, the truth commission 
concluded that “the controversy that surrounded the suitability of its 
Chairperson” was one of the main reasons why donors were 
unwilling to support it.66 
 
                                                 
62 Interviews with ICTJ-Kenya spokesperson, Nairobi, Kenya June 23, 2011 and 
Kenya Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission staff member A, Nairobi, 
Kenya June 20, 2011. 
63 Samwel Kumba, “Kiplagat Row Splits Locals,” The Nation (Nairobi) March 30, 
2010; available from www.lexisnexis.com. 
64 Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Kenya, “Progress Report to the 
National Assembly,”(24 June 2011), 39; available from  www.tjrckenya.org. 
65 Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Kenya, “Progress Report to the 
National Assembly,” (24 June 2011), 39; available from  www.tjrckenya.org. 
66 Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Kenya, “Progress Report to the 
National Assembly,” (24 June 2011), 38; available from  www.tjrckenya.org. 
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Efforts to resolve the crisis 
In April 2010, the commissioners asked Chief Justice Evan Gicheru 
to begin the process to determine whether Kiplagat should be 
removed from the commission.  That same month Betty Murungi, 
the commissioner with the most credibility among the Kenyan 
human rights community, resigned her seat.  Yet the government did 
not move expeditiously to address Kiplagat’s case.  In October, 
Commissioner Ron Slye, the most visible international commissioner, 
announced his intension to resign citing his belief that the 
commission could not complete its mandate under Kiplagat’s 
leadership.  However, before Slye’s resignation came into effect, the 
government announced that it would investigate Kiplagat’s 
appointment, so Slye remained.  On November 2, Kiplagat stepped 
aside from day to day work of the commission, and the Chief Justice 
appointed the Tribunal.  The TJRC soon received an extension to its 
two-year mandate and, for the next 16 months, worked without 
Ambassador Kiplagat in office.   
 Yet, the Tribunal’s work was halted when Kiplagat instigated 
a legal case against it; at issue was its mandate.   According to the 
TJRC’s founding legislation, a Tribunal could remove a 
commissioner on the grounds of “misbehavior or misconduct” while 
serving.  Initially, the commission asked  Chief Justice Gicheru to 
investigate whether Ambassador Kiplagat was in violation of the Act 
when he submitted to the selection committee, and then maintained 
while chairman, that he was not “involved, implicated, linked or 
associated with human rights violations” likely to come before the 
commission.67  However, the Chief Justice mandated a Tribunal in 
November 2010 to investigate “the allegations that the said 
Chairman’s past conduct erodes and compromises his legitimacy and 
credibility to chair the Commission.” 68  Ambassador Kiplagat 
immediately filed an application first before the Tribunal and then the 
                                                 
67 Kenya Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, “Report”  Volume I 
chapter 4, 128; available from  www.tjrckenya.org. 
68 Kenya Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, “Report”  Volume I 
chapter 4, 130; available from  www.tjrckenya.org. 
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High Court challenging investigations into his conduct prior to 
becoming Chairman.   
 The High Court halted the work of the Tribunal but not the 
countdown on its 6 month mandate while the court considered 
Kiplagat’s case.  Then, when the Tribunal’s mandate expired before 
the High Court case heard statements, Kiplagat withdrew his case 
against the Tribunal.  As a result, the High Court never had 
opportunity to rule on whether the Chief Justice’s Tribunal had been 
properly constituted, and the Tribunal itself never pronounced 
whether Kiplagat was guilty of misbehavior and misconduct or had 
conflicts of interest with his commission. 
 There was also a concurrent case that muddied the legal 
issues at least as perceived by some in the public.  A lobby group 
Kenyans Against Impunity began separate proceedings against the 
commission asserting that the selection process laid out by the Act 
had not been followed and that Kiplagat’s oath of office had not 
been properly administered.69   In November 2011, a three judge 
panel that found that the composition and work of the selection 
panel and the administration of the oaths of office had been 
procedurally correct according to law.  Furthermore, it determined that 
the court was not the appropriate venue for the applicants to seek the 
removal of Kiplagat on the merit of his appointment and noted that 
the Chief Justice’s Tribunal had been established.  Therefore this case 
against the TJRC and Kiplagat was dismissed.  However, many in the 
press and Kiplagat himself interpreted this as clearing him of all 
allegations.70 
 In the meantime, Ambassador Kiplagat had been called to 
testify to the truth commission as a person “named adversely” by 
many witnesses who gave statements regarding the Wagalla Massacre.  
His description of the TJRC as “his commission” at the time, led 
reporters and civil society groups to questioned his precise official 
                                                 
69 Kenya High Court, “Republic v Truth Justice & Reconciliation Commission & 
another Ex-parte Augustine Njeru Kathangu & 9 others” [Kenya High Court Misc 
App. No 470 of 2009]; available from  www.kenyalaw.org. 
70 Kenya Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, “Report”  Volume I 
chapter 4, 150; available from  www.tjrckenya.org. 
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role.  The commission also made plans to call Kiplagat to testify as 
“an adversely mentioned person with respect to irregular land 
acquisition and the assassination of the Honourable Dr. Robert 
Ouko.”71 
 Then in January 2012 Kiplagat unexpectedly returned to the 
Commission offices, demanded access to the office of the Acting 
Chairperson and told the press that he was “back with a bang.”72   He 
argued that because there were no active legal cases against him he 
should return to work.  With critics once again up in arms against 
Kiplagat, questioning the TJRC’s neutrality and demonstrating 
outside their offices, the remaining commissioners initially refused to 
work with Kiplagat and sought recourse in the courts.  They asked 
the Kenyan High Court to forbid Ambassador Kiplagat to return to 
work until a Tribunal had addressed the allegations concerning his 
suitability.  Furthermore, they asked the High Court to order the 
current Chief Justice Willy Mutunga to create such a Tribunal in 
accordance with the TJRC Act.73  However, Justice Mohamed 
Warsame ruled against the commission, and Chief Justice Mutunga 
refused to (re)constitute a tribunal.74 
                                                 
71 Kenya Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, “Report”  Volume I 
chapter 4, 138; available from  www.tjrckenya.org. 
72 Wahome Thuku, “Kiplagat back at Truth Commission,” The Standard (January 17 
2012). 
73Kenya High Court, “ Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission v the Chief 
Justice of the Republic of Kenya & Bethuel Kiplagat” Judicial Case No 7 of 2012. 
(February 24, 2012); available from  www.kenyalaw.org. 
74 Justice Warsame’s ruling and the Commission’s argument are confusing. See 
Kenya High Court, “Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission v the Chief 
Justice of the Republic of Kenya & Bethuel Kiplagat” Judicial Case No 7 of 2012. 
(February 24, 2012); available from www.Kenyalaw.org.  The Commission’s lawyers 
appear to have asked that the Court order the Chief Justice to establish a new 
tribunal with a mandate similar to the first one i.e. to investigate “the allegations 
that the past conduct of [Mr. Kiplagat] erodes and compromises his legitimacy and 
credibility to chair” (p. 4) rather than the narrower language of the TJRC’s original 
petition to the Chief Justice to investigate whether Kiplagat’s maintenance of his 
sworn affidavit, that he was not linked to any violations to come before the 
commission, was misconduct.  Justice Warsame determined that the Chief Justice 
would have no power to appoint a tribunal to investigate a commissioner’s past 
24
Transitional Justice Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 3
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/tjreview/vol1/iss3/3
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5206/tjr.2015.1.3.3
  
 
 
 
 
65   The Importance of Commissioners and Their Appointment Process 
 
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.3, 2015, 41-71 
 
 The impasse was finally broken via negotiations made 
possible by the Ministry of Justice and Kenya’s Commission on 
Administrative Justice.  In April 2012, Chairman Kiplagat and the 
other commissioners agreed that he would return the TJRC but 
would not be involved writing the final report.  He could review the 
final report, but an Aide Memoire specified that he would not be able 
to review parts of the Report “concerning massacres, political 
assassinations, and land” and would have the same rights and 
opportunities as adversely mentioned persons, to make his case 
before the commission.75  The Commission pledged upon the release 
of its Report that it “can categorically state the final drafts of the 
chapters of the Report dealing with land, political assassinations, and 
massacres were drafted without any input or influence by Kiplagat” 
and that he was given the opportunity to “write a response or 
dissenting opinion.”76   
 Kiplagat chose to dissent in the press.   Only, a few days after 
handing the report to President Uhuru Kenyatta, the Chairman stood 
before reporters criticizing some of the commission’s methods, 
findings, and powers.  He said, “If you read on Ouko, Wagalla and 
land, findings and recommendations do not tally... the commission 
will have a difficult time proving their case in court in case some of 
the accused take legal action...  You cannot just hand over a report 
and say prosecute.”77 Thus, the scandal surrounding the 
Commission’s leadership continues to undermine Kenya’s truth-
seeking efforts. 
                                                                                                             
behavior and therefore would not order the Chief Justice to do so (pp.14-16).  
Furthermore, Justice Warsame apparently referring to the Kathangu v TJRC High 
Court ruling, determined that “the controversy once settled by the authoritative 
decision of the High Court should not be re-opened unless there are extraordinary 
reasons for doing so” and implied that this was “frivolous and vexatious” litigation 
created by “meddlesome interlopers” (pp.16-17).  
75 Kenya Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, “Report”  Volume I 
chapter 4, Appendix 10, 212; available from  www.tjrckenya.org. 
76 Kenya Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, “Report”  Volume I 
chapter 4, 141; available from  www.tjrckenya.org. 
77 Capital FM (Nairobi)  “Kiplagat Doubts TJRC Report Will Pass the Test of 
Time” May 23 2013; available from www.allafrica.com. 
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How did this happen? 
Some Kenyans believe that Bethuel Kiplagat was appointed 
chairperson of the TJRC to allow the tradition of impunity to 
continue to pollute their country.78  However, the evidence 
undermines this hypothesis in three ways.  First, it was civil society 
organizations themselves who led the selection process that 
recommended that the President name Kiplagat to the commission.  
Second, while chairman, Kiplagat did not support the government’s 
most prominent attempt to co-opt the truth commission.  Finally, the 
government’s pattern of granting funds and extensions to the TJRC 
and participating in its legal wrangling is more indicative of 
uncertainty over what do so with the commission rather than a 
concerted plan to support Kiplagat’s chairmanship. 
 Consequently, I hypothesize that the most plausible 
explanation for this debacle is that President Kibaki, lukewarm to the 
entire truth-seeking project at best, took advantage of the 
opportunity handed to him, not created by him, to appoint a 
controversial chairman.  Although there is no evidence that Kiplagat 
agreed to try to protect government officials from the commission’s 
investigations, it likely comforted Kibaki to have a chairperson who 
was not a political outsider.  Furthermore, it served the government’s 
interest, and is in keeping with Kibaki’s decision-making style, to 
launch a flawed commission and let it flounder, hopefully to 
eventually capsize. 
 The opportunity to undermine the truth commission was 
provided by the inattentive work of the Selection Committee.  
Bethuel Kiplagat’s candidacy was initiated and supported by peace 
sector civil society groups.  The National Council of Churches of 
Kenya initially nominated him; Kiplagat had previously served as the 
Council’s Deputy General Secretary.79  After leaving Moi’s 
government, Kiplagat had been active in regional peace-keeping 
initiatives and had denounced Kenya’s post-election violence.  At the 
                                                 
78 Interview with International Centre for Policy and Conflict spokesperson, 
Nairobi, Kenya June  22, 2011. 
79 Sarah Wambui, “Kenyan Lawyer Faults Tutu on TJRC,” Capital FM (February 
26, 2010); available from www.capitalfm.co.ke. 
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time of nomination, he was Executive Director of Africa Peace 
Forum. 
 Struggling to evaluate the approximately 250 nominees in the 
allowed week, the Selection Committee failed to adequately vet the 
finalists.  One member Florence Simbi-Jaoko explained that the 
selection committee “relied on an affidavit in which we asked those 
we interviewed to swear that their past was clean.”80  So even though 
it was mandated that a commissioner not be implicated or associated 
with any human rights violation, the selection committee conducted 
no independent background checks of nominees.  Another member 
Isaiah Kubai explained later that he felt it had not been the 
responsibility of the Panel to investigate candidates’ past because that 
should have been Parliament’s obligation.81 Their colleague, Evans 
Monari said that none of the criticisms of Kiplagat found in the press 
after his appointment were brought to the attention of the Selection 
Panel.82 In the end, the Selection Panel placed Kiplagat among the 
fifteen recommended nominees and ranked him near the top. 
 President Kibaki had even less interest in setting up a 
vigorous truth commission in 2008 than he had been in 2003 when 
he shelved the recommendations of the Mutua Task Force.  This new 
truth commission had a mandate to move beyond the Kenyatta-Moi 
years to investigate more recent human rights and economic crimes 
of the new administration as well as the post-election violence 
committed by supporters of both presidential candidates.  Therefore, 
few politicians would enthusiastically welcome an active independent 
truth commission.  So when President Kibaki was given an 
opportunity to select a chairperson who was a seasoned politician 
with professional and personal ties to government, it is not surprising 
that he appointed the former ambassador to the chair while two 
highly respected prominent clergymen with no previous ties to the 
                                                 
80 Samwel Kumba, “Kenya: Truth Team Selection Panel on the Spot,” Daily Nation 
(February 26, 2010); available from www.allafrica.com. 
81 Samwel Kumba, “Kenya: Truth Team Selection Panel on the Spot,” Daily Nation 
(February 26, 2010); available from www.allafrica.com. 
82 Sarah Wambui, “Kenyan Lawyer Faults Tutu on TJRC,” Capital FM (February 
26, 2010); available from www.capitalfm.co.ke. 
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government would be left off the commission entirely.  One does not 
have to go so far as to believe in collusion between Kiplagat and the 
Kibaki government to see why Kiplagat might have been preferred.  
 Another reason to discount the grand conspiracy thesis is that 
under Kiplagat’s leadership, the TJRC commissioners publicly 
resisted the government over a proposed change to their mandate, 
which overlapped with other judicial efforts to prosecute those most 
responsible for human rights crimes during Kenya’s post-election 
violence.  Agreements made during Kenya’s National Dialogue also 
obliged the government to prosecute people responsible for post-
election crimes.  The Commission of Inquiry into Post-election 
Violence (the Waki Commission) in October 2008 announced that it 
had evidence that a number of prominent individuals, whom it did 
not name, should be prosecuted for alleged crimes surrounding the 
election.  In July 2009, when the Kenyan government declined to 
establish appropriate trials for those individuals, their names were 
handed over to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC).83   
 Although Kenyan authorities had failed to establish a local 
tribunal to try people implicated in the post-election violence, many 
politicians regard an ICC case as an even more dangerous alternative.  
Therefore, in a last ditch effort, Kibaki announced that his cabinet 
was considering expanding the mandate the TJRC to include 
investigations of those suspected of post-election violence.84 This 
infuriated critics who accused the government of working to 
maintain the impunity of prominent suspects.  Dr. Makau Mutua, for 
                                                 
83 In December  2010 ICC prosecutor announced charges against six suspects in 
this case—William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey, Joshua Arap Sang (then 
allied with Odinga’s Orange Democratic Movement and Francis Kirimi Muthaura, 
Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, and Mohamed Hussein Ali (allied with Kibaki’s Party of 
National Unity)—for their alleged responsibility in the commission of crimes 
against humanity.  All six first appeared before the court in April 2011, but the 
cases against all but Ruto, Arap Sang and Kenyatta were dropped.   In 2013, Uhuru 
Kenyatta was elected President of Kenya and William Ruto became Vice-President.  
All three cases continue before the ICC. 
84 BBC Monitoring Africa, “Kenyan Cabinet Opts for Truth Body to Deal with 
Post-Poll Crimes,” (July 30, 2009); available from  www.lexisnexis.com. 
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example, wrote a blistering editorial directly accusing the government 
of appointing Kiplagat chair of the commission so that it could move 
the post-election violence suspects over to its jurisdiction and then 
shield them from harsh scrutiny and punishment.85   
 Mr. Kiplagat’s actions, however, do not suggest that he had 
agreed to collude with the government over the truth commission’s 
agenda and work.  Rather he joined the other commissioners in 
vehemently rejecting the proposal.  They wrote to the Minister for 
Justice and Constitutional Affairs to express their firm objection, and 
Ambassador Kiplagat told the press that they were all prepared to 
resign if the proposal went forward.86  It did not. 
 Furthermore, the pattern of government funding of the TJRC 
does not suggest the existence of a concerted strategy to back a 
purposely co-opted commission under Kiplagat.  If the Kenyan 
government had plotted to establish a weak truth commission led by 
a “plant,” then it seems logical that it would have been more 
generous with its funds when Kiplagat led the commission as 
opposed to after he had stepped down.  Instead the opposite 
happened.  As noted above, the TJRC repeatedly approached the 
government for supplemental allocations both before and shortly 
after Ambassador Kiplagat stepped aside in November 2010.  The 
precarious funding situation was finally alleviated in April 2011 when 
the government gave the commission an award more than twice the 
size of its initial pledge to the commission under Kiplagat’s 
leadership.87 
 There is no obvious straightforward interpretation of this 
funding pattern.  Many factors extraneous to the Kenyan 
government’s desires for the truth commission surely impact its 
budgetary decisions.  However, it does not clearly support the 
conspiracy argument that Kenyan authorities planned to use Kiplagat 
                                                 
85 The Nation (Nairobi), “Nothing Could Be More Insulting to Kenyans,”( August 
2, 2009); available from www.lexisnexis.com. 
86 BBC Monitoring Africa, “Chair of Kenya’s Truth Commission Defies Cabinet 
over Mandate,” (August 20, 2009); available from www.lexisnexis.com. 
87 Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Kenya, “Progress Report to the 
National Assembly,” (24 June 2011), 40.  Available:  www.tjrckenya.org. 
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to undermine the truth seeking agenda.  There are some who say that 
the reason the government was not more generous to the Kiplagat-
led commission was that it feared that Kiplagat would soon have to 
leave the post.88 According to this interpretation, the government 
didn’t want to get the commission on solid ground only to then lose 
its friendly chairman.  But if a conspiracy was afoot, the government 
would have felt more confident working with a commission led by 
Kiplagat as opposed to an uncertain future of a commission with 
another chairperson.  It seems more logical to try to get a friendly 
truth commission up and running and over with quickly so as to 
complete that obligation as painlessly as possible.   Furthermore, the 
conspiracy interpretation cannot explain why the government was 
comparatively more generous funding the commission once 
Namachanja Wanjala became Acting Chairperson. 
 This funding pattern suggests that the government was 
willing to allow the commission process to make its own mistakes, 
support it as little as possible and respond to opportunities and 
demands as they evolved.  It is clear that the government did not 
want a vigorous truth commission so they funded it poorly and 
hoped to watch it fade away or self-destruct under Kiplagat.  
However, when the commission did not implode and managed to 
demonstrate that Kenyans wanted the process to continue, the 
Kenyan government released more funds. 
 
Conclusion  
The near death experience of Kenya’s Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission brought on by the scandal surround the 
appointment of Bethuel Kiplagat as its chairperson offers three main 
lessons to inform those establishing future truth commissions.  First, 
as important as it is to establish a selection process designed to 
achieve the greatest possible legitimacy the truth-seeking body, 
excellent plans are only as good as the work of people who 
implement them.  Second, in a context of limited government 
                                                 
88 Interview with ICTJ-Kenya spokesperson, Nairobi, Kenya June 23, 2011. 
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support for a truth commission, any error in the selection process 
that might jeopardize a truth commission may be utilized by its 
opponents in government.  It does not take government subterfuge 
to undermine a truth commission; insufficient will to protect it from 
errors can be adequate.  Finally, the practical lesson that comes from 
this case is to allocate sufficient time for the selection process to 
unfold and provide transparency so that candidate commissioners 
can be carefully vetted.  Do not assume that a process implemented 
by civil society will ensure that appropriate commissioners are 
selected.   In this case, once civil society organizations hurriedly put 
forward a panel of possible commissioners that included a candidate 
likely to keep the commission from gaining credibility, the Kibaki 
government declined to protect the truth commission from this 
error. 
 On a positive note, the Kenyan TJRC did eventually issue a 
commendable report.   The commission staffed worked in extremely 
difficult and uncertain circumstances, at times without pay, to press 
for a solution to the problem of their chairman, creatively seek allies 
and demonstrate what the truth commission could achieve for 
Kenyans.  Their work was facilitated and buoyed up by a second 
factor—Kenyans’ willingness to participate in the truth-seeking 
project.   Even when the truth commission’s fate was far from 
certain, over 30,000 individuals submitted statements concerning 
crimes in Kenya’s past, which is the largest number of statements 
received to date by any truth commission.89  Furthermore, in 2011 
when the TJRC began its public hearing phase, people turned out in 
large numbers to testify and listen.  There was heart-rending 
testimony given at well-attended early hearings in North Eastern 
Province and in Mt. Elgon, which demonstrated popular desire for 
truth-seeking and justice.  Nongovernmental organizations responded 
to the evidence of popular interest and began to give more support to 
the truth commission, and the TJRC persevered. 
                                                 
89 Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Kenya, “Progress Report to the 
National Assembly,” (24 June 2011), iii; available from  www.tjrckenya.org. 
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